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Jack Holland, University of Surrey, April 6
th
 2010 
ÔWhen you think of the Taleban, think of the NazisÕ:  
Teaching Americans Ô9-11Õ in NBCÕs ÔThe West WingÕ 
 
Abstract
1
 
Only three weeks after the events of September 11th 2001, Aaron SorkinÕs ÔThe West WingÕ 
delivered a special one off episode, outside of usual storylines.  The episode, titled ÔIsaac and 
IshmaelÕ, is interesting because it adopts an explicitly pedagogical theme to teach viewers 
how to think about the event of 9-11.  The episode can thus be read as an instance in the 
wider construction of the meaning of those events.  In this respect, this article argues that the 
production of the episode contributed to notions of rupture and exceptionalism.  In addition, 
despite the potentially ÔliberalÕ and ÔacademicÕ lessons given by the showÕs stars, the 
extensive contextualisation of the previously incomprehensible events for a dominantly 
American audience actually relayed, amplified and reinforced the emerging dominant 
discourses of the Bush Administration.  Accepting and repeating official tropes, The West 
Wing ultimately served to further limit space for debate in the wake of 9-11. 
 
1. Introduction 
On October 3rd 2001, three weeks after the events of September 11th, episode 0 series 3 of 
NBCÕs The West Wing aired in the United States.  Attempting to confront the events of 
September 11th head on, this episode was remarkable in a number of ways.  First, the showÕs 
creator, Aaron Sorkin, deemed it necessary to produce an episode (the only episode ever) that 
did not follow the ongoing plotlines of the popular series.  Interpreted as an exceptional event 
and moment of temporal rupture, The West Wing responded to 9-11 with an exceptional 
episode and a temporal rupture of their own.  Second, having been produced in only two 
weeks and written in only two or three days, the episode presented a Ôformidable logistical 
challenge for the directors, editors and castÕ, who were left Ôscrambling to meet a virtually 
unprecedented production scheduleÕ.2  Third, the speed of this televisual ÔresponseÕ to the 
events in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania ensured that it Ôwas the first TV show to 
address the events and aftermath of 9/11Õ.3  Fourth, the West Wing achieved extremely high 
viewing figures of approximately twenty-eight million (an 18/26 rating/share), ÔIsaac and 
IshmaelÕ received the showÕs highest ever viewing figures and was the most watched 
programme in the United States that week.4  Fifth, the show was met with a generally 
polarised critical and popular reception.  While some noted that it felt like Ôop-edÕ TV and 
others found it ÔpreachyÕ, these readings of the one-off ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ episode were in 
the minority amongst the general public, with most reviews voicing positive readings and 
warm approval for the showÕs attempt to tackle the issue dominating US politics and society 
                                                             
1 I would like to thank the editors, two anonymous referees, Stuart Croft and Matt McDonald for their insightful 
comments on earlier versions of this article. 
2 Brian Lowry, 'The West Wing' Is in a Rush to WrapÕ, Los Angeles Times, October 2, 2001; Aaron Sorkin, 
ÔInterview - Post Terror America: Hollywood ReactsÕ, Occidental Policy Forum, October 22, 2001. 
3 Kel, ÔMessage 9150 of AaronSorkin@yahoogroups.comÕ, The West Wing Episode Guide, posted October 6, 
2001, accessed March 23, 2011, http://www.westwingepguide.com/S3/Episodes/45_IAI.html. 
4 Internet Movie Database, ÔThe West WingÕ, (2001), accessed December 10, 2010 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0200276/news?year=2001. 
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at the time.5  Approximately forty per cent found the show sufficiently engaging to afford it 
the highest possible ratings, awarding ten stars out of ten, with the episode declared a ÔWing-
ed VictoryÕ despite some critics arguing that Sorkin had Ôwimped out on terrorÕ.6  In general, 
reviewers found the episode to be Ôvery informativeÕ and helpful in Ôclarifying issues after 9-
11Õ.7   
ÔI loved this episode coz I think it wonderfully manages to walk the fine line of 
honouring the events of 9/11 while still reasonably and calmly talking about what 
happened and why. A very educated and informative episode!Õ8 
Against this background, the episode arguably offers Ôthe perfect example of knowledge 
transfer and emancipative anti-racist educationÕ.9  Mining traditional liberal themes of 
cosmopolitanism and understanding, the episode represents an attempt to forge a broadly 
Ôliberal responseÕ to the events of 9-11 at a time when these alternative voices had generally 
fallen silent.10  This article argues that far from offering distinct interpretations, framings and 
responses to September 11th, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ instead helped to reinforce official emerging 
narratives and invalidate alternatives.  In this respect, understanding both the production and 
reception of ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ requires that the episode be Ôre-contextualisedÕ within the 
post 9-11 moment, characterised by an initial Ôvoid in meaningÕ and a subsequent 
construction of crisis of which ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ was ultimately a part.11  Placed back into 
this tumultuous moment, it becomes apparent that the purportedly Ôliberal responseÕ 
articulated in ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ is limited and limiting.  No fewer than sixteen dominant 
tropes are invoked, the most significant twelve of which are discussed here.  These tropes 
gave credence to official narratives and narrowed the space for debate in the wake of 9-11.  
ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ ultimately served to reinforce the Bush AdministrationÕs response to the 
events of September 11th, simultaneously helping to silence dissent along the way.  In this, 
                                                             
5 See, for instance, reviews at: TV.com, ÔEpisode Guide: Isaac and IshmaelÕ, accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://www.tv.com/the-west-wing/isaac-and-ishmael/episode/77672/summary.html; Internet Movie Database, 
ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, accessed December 10, 2010, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0745644/; and The West Wing 
Unofficial Continuity Guide, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://westwing.bewarne.com/third/isaac.html. 
6 The average rating for the show was 8.1 out if 10.  Interestingly, for non-Americans the average was only 7.6 
compared to 8.7 for United States citizens.  Potential reasons for this divergence will be borne out in the article. 
Internet Movie Database, ÔThe West WingÕ, (2001), accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0200276/news?year=2001; Adam Buckman, ÔWest Wing Wimps Out of TerrorÕ, 
New York Post, October 4, 2001. 
7 Sil_lee, ÔFansÕ Reviews: A very special episode to clarify issues after 9/11Õ, TV.com, October 16, 2007, 
accessed December 10, 2010, http://www.tv.com/the-west-wing/isaac-and-
ishmael/episode/77672/summary.html. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ruth Wodak, ÔThe Glocalisation of Politics in TelevisionÕ, European Journal of Cultural Studies 13, no. 1 
(2010): 50. 
10 Ronald Krebs and Peter Jackson, ÔTwisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political RhetoricÕ, 
European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 35-66; Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz, ÔThe 
Sound of Silence: Rhetorical Coercion, Democratic Acquiescence, and the Iraq WarÕ, in American Foreign 
Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation and 9-11, eds. Trevor Thrall and Jane Cramer, (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2009); Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz, 'Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and 
the Road to War in Iraq ', Security Studies 16, no. 3 (2007): 409-451. 
11 David Campbell, 'Time Is Broken: The Return of the Past in the Response to September 11', Theory and 
Event 5, no. 4 (2001): 1-11; Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Jack Holland, ÔFrom September 11th 2001 to 9-11: From Void to CrisisÕ, International 
Political Sociology 3, no. 3 (2009): 275-292. 
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sadly, The West Wing was typical of the broader ÔliberalÕ response to 9-11.12  As a powerful, 
popular and emotive television series, The West Wing was able to make important 
contributions to political (im)possibility. Powerful entertainment programmes have the ability 
to widen the space for debate and challenge dominant orthodoxies.  In light of this 
recognition, it is particularly noteworthy that ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ contributed to a narrowing 
of political dialogue after 9-11.  In ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, The West Wing reflected (and 
arguably helped to drive) calls for a more muscular liberalism in the realm of foreign policy 
after September 11th 2001.13 
 
2. Context: Filling the Post 9-11 Discursive Void 
Temporality was and has been of crucial significance to making sense of the events of 
September 11th 2001.  Notwithstanding clichd narratives of Ônight falling on a different 
worldÕ and 9-11 as Ôthe day the world changedÕ, it is apparent that for the majority of United 
States citizens the events clearly marked and heralded a moment of temporal rupture.14  
Transformed into passive ÔviewersÕ, Americans struggled to make sense of the unfolding 
events as they seemed to contradict the existing truths of US security culture and few 
authorised voices were forthcoming in explaining the situation to a bewildered public.  As I 
have argued elsewhere, the wrong (the disproving of perceived security truths) and the lack 
(the failure to narrate) were the twin arms of the void that held Americans in a stunned, silent 
embrace.15   
 
On the first arm, American security culture had long promulgated myths of invulnerability 
and invincibility.  Although peaking in the Ôunipolar momentÕ of the 1990s, with declarations 
of the Ôend of historyÕ, the popular image of being separated from the dangers and corruption 
of the rest of the world was an enduring myth in American politics and society.16  Tracing to 
the Monroe Doctrine and beyond, Americans had long considered themselves blessed by God 
with the protection of two vast oceans.17  The events of September 11th took place against this 
predominant understanding of AmericaÕs blessed geography and were subsequently met with 
spatial and temporal distanciation.  Events were frequently denied and disregarded as either 
                                                             
12 See, for example, James Brassett, 'Cosmopolitanism vs. Terrorism? Discourses of Ethical Possibility Before, 
and After 7/7', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 36, no. 2 (2008): 121-147. 
13 Rachel Gans-Boriskin, R. and Russ Tisinger, ÔThe Bushlett Administration: Terrorism and War on the West 
WingÕ, Journal of American Culture 28, no. 1 (2005): 100-113.  The phrase Ômuscular liberalismÕ refers to 
broadly neoconservative calls in the United States for a more robust defence of liberal values abroad, often 
through the military force.  The term has since been given a greater domestic focus, to which this article does 
not allude, as adopted and adapted by British Prime Minister David Cameron.  See, David Cameron, ÔSpeech to 
the Munich Security ConferenceÕ, Munich, February 5, 2011. 
14 George W. Bush, ÔAddress to Joint Session of Congress and the American PeopleÕ, Capitol Building, 
Washington D.C., September 20, 2001; see Holland, ÔFrom Void to CrisisÕ. 
15 Holland, ÔFrom Void to CrisisÕ; see also Campbell, ÔTime is BrokenÕ; and Dirk Nabers, ÔFilling the Void of 
Meaning: Identity Construction in U.S. Foreign Policy After September 11, 2001Õ, Foreign Policy Analysis 5, 
no. 2 (2009): 191-214. 
16 Charles Krauthammer, ÔThe Unipolar MomentÕ, Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990 / 1991 Winter): 22-33; 
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man, (London: Macmillan, 1992). 
17 John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, Joanna Jackson Goldman Memorial 
Lecture on American Civilization and Government. (London: Harvard University Press, 2004); Jack Greene, 
The Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Books, 1993). 
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news from some other country or from some previous time; Americans struggled to accept 
that the events were happening ÔnowÕ and they were happening ÔhereÕ.18 
 
On the second arm, the incomprehensibility of (what would later become) Ô9-11Õ arose due to 
the difficulty, and often impossibility, of subsuming the events within existing frameworks of 
intelligibility.  The events of September 11th were ÔunspeakableÕ as Americans lacked an 
appropriate language to describe what they were seeing.19  Unlike, for example, British, 
Spanish or Sri Lankan experiences, Americans lacked a language for the illegitimate use of 
large-scale, external violence on domestic soil.20  The lack of an appropriate language to 
make sense of 9-11 meant that cues were frequently taken from unofficial sources and 
ÔlowerÕ levels of cultural life.  Religion and films were frequently drawn upon as initial 
American attempts to comprehend 9-11 took place at the level of the individual in contrast to 
the more commonplace intersubjective understandings that are produced through discursive 
regularities.21  The resulting discursive void Ð as a lack of shared meaning regulated by an 
overarching narrative Ð saw a plethora of competing and fragmentary understandings in place 
of more commonplace harmonised meaning.  In short, the cultural shock of 9-11 was 
compounded by the emptiness of the space usually occupied by assured ÔofficialÕ voices. 
 
These twin arms Ð the wrong and the lack Ð then represent an inability to comprehend and an 
inability to articulate.  If discursive failure is symptomatic of what Campbell has termed the 
Ôvoid in meaningÕ, it is the cultural shock that is symptomatic of what Edkins has termed 
ÔtraumaÕ.22  Succinctly, 9-11 invalidated notions of anarchy, chaos and danger existing only 
beyond the borders of the United States.  Falling outside of expected and predictable patterns 
of politics and everyday life, 9-11 was a traumatic event in that it was seen to demand a 
response.  The insistence on a response outside of usual politics reflected the reading and 
experience of 9-11 as having occurred beyond politics-as-usual.  It was this demand Ð even 
yearning Ð to be communicated and to ÔreplyÕ that generated such acute tension, as the void 
was marked by the very difficulty of communicating what had happened for the public.  It 
was in this tension that President Bush had begun to articulate an official response and Aaron 
Sorkin wrote, directed and produced ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, outside of The West Wing 
continuity.   
 
3. The West Wing 
The West Wing first aired on NBC in September 1999, going on to run over seven series.  The 
show drew high audiences Ð the finale of series two attracted over twenty million viewers in 
the United States Ð and was critically acclaimed, winning three Golden Globes and twenty-
                                                             
18 Croft, Culture; Holland, ÔFrom Void to CrisisÕ. 
19 Heinz Steinert, 'Unspeakable September 11th: Taken for-Granted Assumptions, Selective Reality 
Construction and Populist Politics', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, no. 3 (2003): 
651-665. 
20 Margo Kleinfeld, 'Strategic Troping in Sri Lanka: September Eleventh and the Consolidation of Political 
Position', Geopolitics 8, no. 3 (2003): 105-126. 
21 Croft, Culture, Holland, ÔFrom Void to CrisisÕ. 
22 Campbell, ÔTime is BrokenÕ; Jennifer Edkins, 'Forget Trauma? Responses to September 11', International 
Relations 16, no. 2 (2002): 243-256; Jennifer Edkins, ÔGround Zero: Reflections on Trauma, in/Distinction and 
ResponseÕ, Cultural Research 8, no. 3 (2004): 247-270. 
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seven Emmy Awards.23  Although the showÕs creators, including Sorkin, were adamant that 
they were creating a work of fiction, numerous real-world parallels were evident from the 
start.  Mockingly referred to by the American Right as ÔThe Left WingÕ, these parallels were 
initially most evident with the Clinton White House.24  Waxman noted the ease of reading 
key characters as counterparts of Clinton Administration officials: Sam Seaborn as George 
Stephanopoulis; Josh Lyman as Paul Begala; and C.J. Cregg as Dee Dee Myers.25  Along 
with numerous other real life politicians and practitioners, Dee Dee Myers actually served as 
a consultant for the show.  And throughout the seven series, the show frequently dealt with 
issues paralleling those that had faced the previous Clinton Administration or that continued 
to challenge the Bush White House. 
 
The showÕs liberal leanings and optimistic outlook meant that reviews were not always 
positive.  The West Wing was mocked in the Weekly Standard and Atlantic Monthly as 
Ônothing more or less than political pornography for liberalsÕ, the Ôultimate Hollywood 
fantasy: the Clinton White House without ClintonÕ and naively ÔCapra-esqueÕ Ôpseudo-
politicsÕ.26  With a Ôtacit mission of the revival of lagging liberal spiritsÕ, right-leaning critics 
were aware that The West Wing was no more than a Ôcultural platform for the revival of 
liberal politics in AmericaÕ.27  While that may have been true, it was clearly nonetheless a 
platform that even the most sceptical critics took seriously, as evidenced by the perceived 
need to comment on and ridicule the popular show.  And after 9-11 it was a platform that 
would be used to give voice to a largely non-existent Ôliberal responseÕ to terrorism.  That 
response came in the form of ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ. 
 
Isaac and Ishmael 
The choice of title is itself interesting and revealing.  As elaborated in the episode, ÔIsaac and 
IshmaelÕ refers to a contested interpretation of the story of Abraham.  The West Wing chose 
to emphasise that Ôwhat most people find important to remember is, in the end, the two sonsÕ, 
Isaac and Ishmael, Ôcame togetherÕ.  This emphasis on unity and Ôcoming togetherÕ through 
the analogy of a story contested in Christian, Jewish and Islamic thought was largely 
welcomed in the United States and mirrored President BushÕs own repeated appeals for 
national unity.  The choice of title does, however, indicate a reading and framing of 
September 11th through a religious lens rather than a political one.  Religious metaphors 
risked constructing a particularly intractable problem and de-politicising the events of 
                                                             
23 Kamila Shamsie, ÔTriumph of the West WingÕ, Prospect, 66, August 20, 2001. 
24 Peter Rollins and John OÕConnor, The West Wing: The American Presidency as Television Drama, (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2003), 3; For later comparisons with the Obama Administration see: Jeanette 
Ballard, ÔHavenÕt We Seen This Election Before?Õ, BBC, September 15, 2008, accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7616333.stm; Christopher Hope, ÔWhy the US Election is Just Like the West WingÕ, 
The Telegraph, February 6, 2008; Jonathon Freedland, ÔFrom West Wing to the Real ThingÕ, The Guardian, 
February 21, 2008, accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/21/barackobama.uselections2008; and Ian Woods, ÔLife Imitating 
Art?Õ, Sky News Blog, November 7, 2008, accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://blogs.news.sky.com/frontlineblog/Post:a8d0d85e-dae0-45b1-ab9e-bf4b8448e3f3. 
25 Sharon Waxman, ÔInside the West WingÕs New WorldÕ, George Magazine, (2002), re-printed in Rollins and 
OÕConnor, The West Wing, 203-212. 
26 Podhoretz cited in Rollins and OÕConnor, The West Wing, 4. 
27 Lehmann cited in Rollins and OÕConnor, The West Wing, 4. 
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September 11th.  These twin moves would ultimately be reinforced throughout the episode, 
centring on the notion that the United States was attacked because of who they are, not what 
they have done. 
 
From the very beginning, it was clear that ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ was not a usual episode of The 
West Wing.  Viewers were made aware of the exceptional nature of the episode and its 
placement outside of the usual West Wing continuity through a number of cues: the episode 
was characterised from the outset by its static filming, in contrast to usual dynamism and 
movement; and, crucially, the episode began with the actors addressing the audience as 
themselves, not their characters.   
Martin Sheen: Good evening, I'm Martin Sheen, and I'm with the cast of The 
West Wing. For those of you who tuned in tonight to see our 
season premiere, I'm afraid you won't. That'll be next week. 
Rob Lowe: We're eager to get back to our continuing storylines, but tonight 
we wanted to stop for a moment and do something different. 
Allison Janney: You'll notice a few things different about this show tonight ... 
Bradley Whitford: ... tonight we offer a play. It's called "Isaac and Ishmael." We 
suggest you don't spend a lot of time trying to figure out where 
this episode comes in the timeline of the series. It doesn't. It's a 
story-telling aberration, if you'll allow. 
Clearly, as Wodak notes, Ôthis episode illustrates an explicit intervention into viewersÕ 
expectations and possible understandings ... present[ing] a parable intended to make people 
reflect on their beliefs and stereotypes about Muslims and ÔothersÕ who have become targets 
for aggression after 9/11Õ.28  This parable is delivered through two parallel stories, told 
concomitantly although not explicitly linked.  The first sees White House Chief-of-Staff, Leo 
McGarry and Head of the PresidentÕs Secret Service Detail, Ron Butterfield interrogating a 
ÔsuspectÕ.  Having been ÔcrashedÕ, The White House is in a state of ÔlockdownÕ and the 
ÔsuspectÕ is aggressively interviewed about his connections to fictional terrorist ÔKharim 
SharifÕ.  The ÔsuspectÕ, Raqim Ali, is held because his name matches a known alias of one of 
Kharim SharifÕs conspirators.  The link is spurious and deliberately so, enabling Sorkin to 
present Leo McGarryÕs suspicions of the Muslim, Arab White House employee as grounded 
in racism, prejudice and misplaced fear.   
Ali:  It is not uncommon for Arab-Americans to be the first 
suspected when that kind of thing [terrorist threat] happens.  
Leo:    I canÕt imagine why. 
This storyline delivers a classic liberal, Jeffersonian narrative on the need to resist 
discrimination in times of national danger.  It warns against the unchecked concentration of 
power in the hands of the Executive and reminds of the need to resist stereotyping in the face 
                                                             
28 Wodak, ÔGlocalisationÕ, 48. 
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of threat and fear.29  Through this storyline Americans were reminded that the perpetrators of 
the September 11th attacks were nineteen fanatical individuals and therefore, in post 9-11 
America, there is no possibility of ÔreadingÕ threat from ethnicity or religious affiliation.   If 
this first story is simplistic to the point of being blunt, it is in marked contrast to the parallel 
second story which attempts to capitalise on the showÕs cast in their positions as authorised 
experts, capable of articulating and explaining events which had thus far left AmericaÕs 
Ôbrightest and bestÕ baffled.  It is also in direct contestation with the second imagining and 
construction of the enemy that the show offers.  Just as in the official language of the Bush 
AdministrationÕs response to 9-11, the show presented a tension between understandings of 
the perpetrators as a group of radical individuals and an organised, omnipresent and 
threatening Islamic enemy.30  And just like the Bush Administration, the show struggled to 
sell the former, whilst delivering an exceptionally resonant lesson on the latter.31  If the 
former encourages a response to 9-11 oriented around a constant refusal to stereotype and a 
need to confront prejudice, the latter is central to maintaining support for a ÔWar on TerrorÕ; 
indeed, the latter naturalises a response of militaristic interventionism. 
 
The format for the second story, in which this second imagining of the enemy is delivered, is 
in itself noteworthy.  A group of school pupils who have been selected for the ÔPresidential 
ClassroomÕ scheme are stuck in the White House Mess Hall due to the lockdown.  Starting 
with Josh Lyman, the White House Deputy Chief of Staff, the showÕs main characters one-
by-one join the group to contribute to a question-and-answer based ÔlessonÕ on terrorism.  
Before moving to consider the answers the show gives, it is important to note two points.  
First, the show has afforded the time to ask questions.   
I felt it was appropriate to just take a week and stop ... I was thinking 'Gee, I've really 
got to stop and pause and take a moment.32 
Executive Producer John Wells recognised in ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ both the need to respond 
and the need to acknowledge the exceptional nature and temporal rupture that 9-11 wrought. 
ÔObviously, everybody in entertainment and series TV have been trying to figure out 
what's the appropriate response, such as what needs to be said on ÔWest WingÕ ...  We 
didn't feel comfortable going back to our fictional White House without taking a 
moment.  Hopefully, we can say something that's useful ... Hopefully, it will make 
people talk and thinkÕ.33   
The experience of 9-11 as a traumatic event Ð as a moment of rupture, outside of normality Ð 
was recognised in the production of ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ as a stand-alone episode.  Second, 
the decision to frame the episode around knowledgeable, but scared and confused children 
asking questions was recognition of the voiceless-ness of the post 9-11 void.  After the events 
                                                             
29 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. (New 
York: Knopf, 2002). 
30 George. W. Bush, ÔRemarks by President Bush and His Majesty King Abdullah of Jordan in a Photo 
OpportunityÕ, White House, Washington D.C. September 28, 2001; George. W. Bush, ÔRemarks by the 
President to Airline EmployeesÕ, OÕHare Airport. September 27, 2001. 
31 See, for example, Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2005); Sandra Silberstein, War of Words: Language, Politics, and 9/11. (London: Routledge, 2002). 
32 Sorkin, ÔInterviewÕ. 
33 John Wells cited in Josef Adalian and Michael Schneider, "Plots are hot spots for nets", Daily Variety, 
September 23, 2001. 
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of September 11th 2001, questions such as Ôwhy do they hate usÕ were commonplace.34  With 
the American public symbolically embodied in school children asking questions about who 
are terrorists and why do they act this way, Sorkin acknowledges and actively reproduces the 
discursive void in meaning that 9-11 induced.  Crucially, the episode also acknowledges and 
reproduces the phase of the War on Terror that would follow.  Despite attempting an 
informed liberal response to terrorism, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ perpetuates the construction of 9-
11 as a crisis through the (re)production of a number of dominant tropes that were beginning 
to define events and fix an increasingly hegemonic meaning to 9-11.  Therefore, not only 
does The West Wing actively reinforce the cultural shock and voicelessness that characterised 
the initial post 9-11 void, but moreover ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ also reaffirms the later 
construction on 9-11 as a moment and marker of crisis by repeating, amplifying and 
contextualising the official narration of the events offered by the Bush Administration.  To 
this end, The West Wing supported the official response to 9-11, helping to both further 
increase the resonance of dominant official narratives and silence dissent by demonstrating 
the apparent convergence of liberal and conservative responses to terrorism. 
 
4. Amplifying Dominant Narratives: The West Wing and 9-11 
ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, despite attempting a considered and informative Ôliberal responseÕ to 
terrorism, reinforced a number of the key tropes that were central to the success of Bush 
Administration policies at the start of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ.  These tropes and narratives can 
be grouped into three main themes, based on the central questions they answer: (i) who are 
the terrorists and what do they want?  (ii) What is going on and how should the United States 
respond?  And (iii) what should we do, as citizens? 
 
4.1 Who are the terrorists and what do they want? 
On the first question Ð who are the terrorists and what do they want? Ð the showÕs stars 
delivered five compelling answers to educate both the fictional pupils and the real world 
American citizens they represented.  First, viewers were reminded that terrorists do want to 
kill American citizens.   
 Girl 1: So... what's the deal with everybody trying to kill you? 
 Josh: Well... it's not everybody, and they're trying to kill you, too. 
In the days and weeks after 9-11, the Bush Administration relied upon the omnipresent threat 
of terrorist attack to pass far-reaching counter-terrorism legislation at home and launch a 
ÔWar on TerrorÕ abroad.  This climate of fear was intense and widespread.  For instance, 
despite later revelations of so-called Ôhome grown terrorÕ, events such as the 2001 Anthrax 
Attacks were readily interpreted as simply the latest instances and confirmation of an 
unfolding War on Terror.  This was, for example, in evidence as Ôwhite powder scaresÕ were 
read through the lens of an emerging and solidifying ÔWar on TerrorÕ discourse.  After one 
such evacuation, many miles from the sites of 9-11, comments included Ôwe could see it from 
the inside É the war reached hereÕ.35 In its early stages, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ contributed to 
                                                             
34 Richard Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism, and the Global Order. (London: 
Routledge, 2003); Jackson, Writing; Silberstein, War of Words. 
35 S. Tulk, uncatalogued sound recording, Witness and Response Collection, Library of Congress, Washington 
D.C., (2001). 
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this tendency to read events through narratives of ÔterrorÕ and the unease they generated, 
before moving to address resultant fears.  Thus, second, Americans were assured that despite 
wanting to kill them, terrorists always fail.   
 Girl 1: You know a lot about terrorism? 
 Sam:  I dabble. 
 Girl 1: What are you struck by most? 
 Sam:  It's 100% failure rate. 
 Girl 1: Really? 
 Sam:  Not only do terrorists always fail at what they're after, they pretty much 
always succeed in strengthening whatever it is they're against. 
As President Bush assured Americans of Ôour victory, not theirsÕ, The West Wing joined him 
in reassuring citizens that this new form of terrorism would Ôfollow in the path of fascism, 
Nazism and totalitarianismÕ to Ôhistory's unmarked grave of discarded liesÕ.36  This assurance 
was important in confirming that a response to 9-11 of ÔWar on TerrorÕ was the correct path 
to follow.  It helped to reassure wavering support and silence doubters.   
 
Third, assured of terrorist failure, The West Wing delivered its most noteworthy answer to 
Ôwho are they?Õ   
 Josh: You're juniors and seniors.  In honour of the SAT's you're about to take, 
answer the following question. Islamic... extremist... is to... Islamic... as... 
"blank" is... to Christianity. 
 Josh writes this on the board for the students, before turning around, writing 
"KKK" and circling it. 
 Josh:  That's what we're talking about. It's the Klan, gone medieval and global. 
This contextualisation of the unnamed Al Qaeda helped to explain the terrorist network to the 
population in a way that the Bush Administration had been struggling to achieve.37  
Eventually and inevitably, the Bush Administration would draw upon the usual reference 
points Ð National Socialism and Communism Ð still synonymous with evil in American 
political culture.  Addressing Congress, Bush warned Americans that Ô[t]housands of 
dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are 
now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warningÕ, but 
that this terrorist evil would go the way of those other evils America had previously faced 
down.38  However, in the first few days and weeks after 9-11, the Bush Administration faced 
the difficult task of articulating this ÔnewÕ and ÔunprecedentedÕ enemy that would inevitably 
be defeated.  Repeated references to terrorists hating freedom, hiding in caves and being evil 
were made (e.g. Bush 2001c; 2001d), but arguably none of these framings contextualised the 
                                                             
36 George. W. Bush, ÔAddress to Joint Session of Congress and the American PeopleÕ, Capitol Building, 
Washington D.C. September 20, 2001. 
37 On initial difficulties in creating compelling narratives, see for instance David Frum, The Right Man: An 
inside Account of the Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003). 
38 George. W. Bush, ÔState of the Union AddressÕ, Capitol Building, Washington D.C. January 29, 2002; 
George. W. Bush, ÔAddress to Joint Session of Congress and the American PeopleÕ, Capitol Building, 
Washington D.C. September 20, 2001. 
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threat and nature of Al Qaeda as succinctly, powerfully or persuasively as The West WingÕs 
KKK analogy.39  This analogy also reinforced the perceived illegitimacy of moral 
equivalencies being drawn as Josh stated that because they Ôare not blowing stuff upÕ the 
Christian Right cannot be the correct answer.  Again, the Bush Administration were at pains 
in the days after 9-11 to invalidate moral equivalencies being drawn between American 
foreign policy and terrorist actions, as well as Christian evangelical groups and Islamic 
fundamentalism.40  In both of these tasks, The West Wing helped to reinforce and sustain the 
efforts of the Bush Administration, further narrowing the space for debate and chances of 
alternative framings in the post 9-11 moment.  Deeming questions of imperial blowback and 
Christian or Western hypocrisy off limits, the Bush Administration was aided and abetted by 
the cast of The West Wing, who ensured Americans knew that fellow citizens and their 
nationÕs foreign policy were not to blame.   
  
Fourth, The West Wing confirmed that even if terrorists do have grievances with US foreign 
policy they cannot possibly be justified.  Thus, despite offering a partial counter-reading that 
was generally placed off-limits by official narratives, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ confirms that 
terrorists target the United States because of American identity and values.  Like the Bush 
Administration, The West Wing reassured Americans that they were attacked Ôbecause we are 
the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the worldÕ, but that they should not 
worry because Ôno one will keep that light from shiningÕ.41 
 Girl 1: Why are Islamic Extremists trying to kill us? 
 Josh:  That's a reasonable question if ever I heard one. Why are we targets of 
war?  
 Boy 2: Because we're Americans. 
 Josh: That's it? 
 Girl 3:  Because of our freedom? 
 Josh: No other reasons?  
 Boy 3:  Freedom and democracy. 
 Josh:  I'll tell you, right or wrong - and I think they're wrong - it's probably a 
good idea to acknowledge that they do have specific complaints. I hear 
them every day Ð the people we support, troops in Saudi Arabia, sanctions 
against Iraq, support for Egypt. It's not just that they don't like Irving 
Berlin. 
 Donna: Yes, it is. 
                                                             
39 George. W. Bush, ÔRemarks by the President to Airline EmployeesÕ, OÕHare Airport. September 27, 2001; 
George. W. Bush, ÔRemarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan in Photo OpportunityÕ, 
The Colonnade. September 25, 2001. 
40 For example, George. W. Bush, ÔRidge Sworn in to Lead Dept of Homeland SecurityÕ, The White House, 
Washington D.C. October 8, 2001.  Bush invoked narratives of a benign and reluctant superpower, arguing that 
September 11th Ôroused a mighty giantÕ. He also argued that Christian evangelicals in the United States were Ôat 
prayerÕ with Jews and Muslims, unlike the ÔevildoersÕ who lacked the Ôtreasure[d]É values,  the freedoms and 
the character of the American peopleÕ. See, for instance, George. W. Bush, ÔRemarks by the President to Airline 
EmployeesÕ, OÕHare Airport. September 27, 2001. 
41 George. W. Bush, ÔAddress to the NationÕ, The White House, Washington D.C. September 11, 2001. 
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 Josh:  No, it's not.  
 Donna:  No, not about Irving Berlin, but your ridiculous search for rational reasons 
why somebody straps a bomb to their chest is ridiculous. 
Despite relying on JoshÕs supposedly superior, more considered and authoritative male logic 
as representative of the liberal voice of reason over DonnaÕs more irrational and scared 
female voice, this remains one of the more critical readings that ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ offers in 
an attempt to recognise that terrorists might not be motivated purely by hatred.  The strategy 
is repeated later in the episode to again represent the two competing discourses that emerged 
in the post 9-11 void: Ôimperial blowbackÕ and Ôthey hate our freedomsÕ.  Portraying an 
enemy motivated by pure hatred, rather than any political grievance (justified or otherwise), 
ensured that questions of American blame were kept Ôoff the tableÕ and beyond the limits of 
acceptable reflection after 9-11.  While ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ was clearly more prepared to 
discuss the possibility of terrorist grievances than official narratives, The West Wing 
ultimately comes down strongly on the side of Ôthey hate our freedomsÕ over Ôimperial 
blowbackÕ in terms of understanding the drivers of terrorist violence.  The conclusion that 
both the Bush Administration and The West Wing lead American citizens towards is that 
while terrorists may have grievances, they are never legitimate and fighting terrorists is 
always about ensuring freedom. 
 Toby: Well, what would you say the point of fighting terrorism is? 
 C.J.: It's to insure freedom, Pokey. I don't need the brochure. 
And, with freedom as the essence of American-ness, ÔWar on TerrorÕ became an inevitable 
response.  As Bush bluntly put it: ÔWe understand the enemy. We understand their hatreds. 
We know they hate freedom. We know we love freedom and we know we're not going to 
change in our love for freedomÕ.42  Framing 9-11 as an attack on freedom, with confronting 
terror logically presented as freedomÕs defence, helped to ensure that Sorkin ultimately aided 
Bush in locking the United States into a logic whereby a ÔWar on TerrorÕ was the only and 
unavoidable response to the events of September 11th 2001. 
 
Fifth, to reinforce the point that fighting terrorists is always and inevitably about defending 
freedom, Toby confirms how Americans should think about the Taleban and Afghanistan. 
 Toby: When you think of Afghanistan, think of Poland. When you think of the 
Taliban, think of the Nazis. When you think of the citizens of Afghanistan, 
think of the Jews in concentration camps.  
To the question Ôwho are they and what do they want?Õ  The West Wing leaves us with the 
over-lexicalised answer that Al Qaeda are the KKK, the Taleban are the Nazis and both want 
to exterminate us and our freedoms, as they are already doing to ordinary Afghani citizens.  
Using these commonly understood reference points, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ teaches Americans 
little that the Bush Administration had not already sanctioned for public consumption.  In the 
same way that Josh performs the role of AmericaÕs teacher in circling the ÔKKKÕ, Toby 
actively lectures and implores Americans Ð so clearly represented in the school children Ð to 
think in particular, far-fetched and dangerous ways.  Just as the Bush Administration relied 
upon the most commonly understood markers of evil in American political culture Ð National 
Socialism and Communism Ð The West Wing explicitly directed viewers to draw comparisons 
                                                             
42 George. W. Bush, ÔCampaign Speech in PennsylvaniaÕ, Pennsylvania, November 1, 2002. 
 
12 
 
between Germany during the Third Reich and Afghanistan under Taleban rule.  This is a 
highly consequential analogy that does more than mark out the Taleban as evil.  
Appeasement and the lessons of Munich are well understood in American political culture.  
By drawing a direct comparison with HitlerÕs Germany, confronting evil trough militaristic 
intervention in Afghanistan is rendered the only logical, moral and responsible course of 
action. 
 
4.2 What is going on and how should the United States respond? 
Having answered the first question, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ broaches a second, addressing the 
broader situation: ÔWhat is going on and how should the United States respond?Õ  In 
response, the cast offers three important and increasingly commonplace tropes.  First, Josh re-
assures the pupils and the watching public that killing terrorists is acceptable: 
 Pupil: Do you favor the death penalty? 
 Josh: No. 
 Pupil: But you think we should kill these people? 
 Josh: You don't have the choices in a war that you do in a jury room. But I wish 
we didn't have to. I think death is too simple. 
A liberal response then regrets having to kill AmericaÕs enemies, but acknowledges that the 
Ôlaw paradigmÕ does not apply here.  For Josh, these were acts of war and it is necessary to 
switch to a Ôwar paradigmÕ to fight back and keep America safe.  C.J. Cregg backs up this 
position in a discussion of civil liberties and security: 
 C.J.:   Look, I talk civil liberties as seriously as anybody, okay? I've been to the 
dinners and we haven't even talked about free speech yet and somebody 
getting lynched by the patriotism police for voicing a minority opinion. 
That said, Tobus, we're going to have to do some stuff. We're going to 
have to tap some phones and we're going to have to partner with some 
people who are the lesser of evils. I'm sorry but terrorists don't have 
armies and navies. They don't have capitals. Some of these guys we're 
going to have to walk up to them and shoot them. Yeah, we can root 
terrorist nests but some of these guys aren't going to be taken by the 105th 
armoured tank division. Some of these guys are going to be taken by a 
busboy with a silencer. So it's time to give the intelligence agencies the 
money and the manpower they need. We don't hear about their successes. 
Guess what? The Soviets never crossed the Elbe. The North Koreans 
stayed behind the 38th parallel. During the Millennium? Not one incident. 
Do you think that's because the terrorists decided that'd be a good day to 
take off? Not much action that day?  
For C.J. the liberty-security debate is a Ôno brainerÕ; faced with an existential terrorist threat, 
Americans should increase defence funding and widen the scope for intelligence officers to 
act.  After 9-11, these are particularly significant arguments to make. On 26th October 2001 
the USA Patriot Act was passed, which established far-reaching legislation to enable 
controversial Ôcounter-terrorismÕ measures such as Ôroving wiretapsÕ, property searches and 
extended periods of detention for suspected terrorists. On 25th November 2001 the 
Department of Homeland Security was established with a budget rising from $20 billion in 
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2002 to $40 billion the following year.43  That C.J., as the showÕs most prominent female 
character, made these points is also noteworthy.  In post 9-11 America, Ôsoccer momsÕ were 
seen to be a new and crucial political and electoral group.  Previously Democratic, but now 
primarily concerned about their childrenÕs safety, this group were seen to represent the 
growing concerns of American women about the threat posed by terrorism.  They were seen 
to favour strong anti-terrorism measures, at the expense of civil liberties, in order to pursue 
the Ôno brainerÕ of keeping American children safe.44  As a result, Ôsoccer momsÕ were 
increasingly identified as Ôsecurity momsÕ.  Thus, like the Bush Administration, The West 
Wing actively contributed to the birth of this psephological grouping by helping to construct 
ÔsecurityÕ as the new womenÕs issue.45 
 
Second, in answer to Ôhow should the United States respond?Õ the pupils are reassured that 
America has friends; and that coalition-building is American. 
 C.J.: There's nothing more American than coalition building. The first thing 
John Wayne always did was put together a posse. 
Of course, BushÕs assertion that Ôyou are either with us, or you are with the terroristsÕ 
attempted to force wavering or indifferent states to explicitly back the US-led response of a 
ÔWar on TerrorÕ.  And at this particular moment, then Secretary of State Colin Powell was 
investing considerable political capital in attempts to court General MusharrafÕs Pakistan.  
That such efforts could be constructed and viewed as a quintessentially all American act of 
putting together posse was useful in light of the fact that such an act could equally (and 
relatively easily) be viewed as straightforward hypocrisy.  As Daalder and Lindsay note, aid 
to Pakistan went from $9 million in the three years before 9-11 to $4.3 billion in the three 
years after the events of September 11th 2001.46 Welcoming Musharraf back into the 
international community, after designating Pakistan a pariah state following his military coup 
of 1999, could very easily have been framed as the logic of a narrow, amoral realpolitik, in 
which concerns for ÔfreedomÕ mattered very little.  Third, the pupils are told why the US must 
take action in Afghanistan, by simply replacing BushÕs harbouring metaphor with that of 
ÔincubatorÕ.  After Bush had argued, Ôwe will make no distinction between terrorists and the 
states who harbour themÕ, The West Wing confirmed the ineluctable link between terrorists 
and their host states. 
 Boy 1: Where do terrorists come from?  
 Josh:  Where do they come from? 
 Sam: Everywhere. Mostly they come from exactly where you'd expect: places 
of abject poverty and despair. Horribly impoverished places are an 
incubator for the worst kind of crime. 
As Charlie goes on to explain, it is no different from the gangs of ÔSouth Central L.A., 
Detroit, the South BronxÕ and ÔSoutheast D.C.Õ.  Linking the present threat to wars Ð gang 
wars, war on drugs Ð that Americans are familiar with and understand the necessity in 
fighting helps to naturalise an assertive, interventionist American response to 9-11.  Having 
already invested hundreds of millions of dollars in lengthy conflicts abroad and faced 
                                                             
43 Department of Homeland Security, ÔBrief History of the Department of Homeland SecurityÕ, (2008), accessed 
December 10, 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/brief_documentary_history_of_dhs_2001_2008.pdf. 
44 Susan Faludi, The Terror Dream: What 9-11 Revealed About America. (Cornwall: MPG Books, 2007). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ivan Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. (New York; 
[Chichester]: Wiley, 2005). 
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repeated news coverage of gang wars at home, Americans had already been exposed to 
arguments that such ÔwarsÕ were clearly in the national interest and for the greater good.  It 
was an analogy that resonated as it contextualised the new threat for Americans by drawing 
on an old threat with which they were already familiar and used to fighting.  As one reviewer 
of ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ noted, Ôwhile all the characters gave amazing performances, there 
were a few standouts. Charlie's comparison of terrorist camps and gangs was really well 
writtenÕ.47  Ironically, for this reviewer, such articulations were useful in teaching Americans 
Ôwhat canÕt be learned in classroomsÕ.48 
 
4.3 What should we do, as Citizens? 
Informed of who the terrorists are, what they want and what America should do, the third 
major question that ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ asks is: ÔWhat should we do, as citizens?Õ  The 
answer again takes three forms.  First, the pupils learn that, as Americans, they should not 
worry (despite having begun the lesson by learning that terrorists want to kill them all), 
continue to put faith in their education and continue to believe in liberal values such as 
pluralism.  
Josh:  But listen, don't worry about all this right now. We got you covered. Worry 
about school. Worry about what you're gonna tell your parents when you 
break curfew. You're gonna meet guys, you're gonna meet girls... Learn things. 
Be good to each other. Read the newspapers, go to the movies, go to a party. 
Read a book. In the meantime, remember pluralism. You want to get these 
people? I mean, you really want to reach in and kill them where they live? 
Keep accepting more than one idea. Makes 'em absolutely crazy. 
All of this was, of course, supposedly the correct response because the government are 
responsible for and capable of keeping Americans safe; politics, terrorism and war should be 
left to the experts, citizens should uphold (liberal) American values and identity.  To this end, 
The West Wing spoke in tandem with BushÕs insistence that ordinary Americans should Ôlive 
your lives and hug your childrenÕ.49  And, while the liberal values advocated might not be 
shared with the Bush Administration, there were also clear parallels with official (neo)liberal 
calls to respond by continuing to shop as normal.50  Through such calls, the official response 
of the Bush Administration and that offered by The West Wing constructed and reaffirmed an 
enabling and dangerous division between the personal and political.  Second, despite the 
overtly Ôliberal responseÕ being put forward, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ confirms that it is normal to 
feel angry and to seek violent retribution.  The West Wing gives voice to a common theme in 
American society during the post 9-11 void: the desire to realise the Jacksonian logic of the 
counter-punch.51  In fusing love and anger, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ adopted a strikingly similar 
tone to BushÕs official announcements on terror.   
                                                             
47 Kickdoor ÔWhat canÕt be learned in classroomsÕ, TV.com, (2010), accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://www.tv.com/the-west-wing/isaac-and-ishmael/episode/77672/summary.html. 
48 Ibid. 
49 George. W. Bush, ÔAddress to Joint Session of Congress and the American PeopleÕ, Capitol Building, 
Washington D.C. September 20, 2001. 
50 Ibid. 
51 See, Holland, ÔFrom Void to CrisisÕ; Gearoid OÕTuathail, "Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Towards 
Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics". In Geopolitical Perspectives on World Politics, edited 
by Lasha Tchantouridze, (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 2003); and Mead, Special 
Providence. 
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 Josh:  I'd put 'em in a small cell, and make them watch home movies of the 
birthdays and baptisms and weddings of every single person they killed, 
over and over, every day, for the rest of their lives [clears his throat]. And 
then they'd get punched in the mouth every night at bedtime. By a 
different person, every night. There'd be a long list of volunteers, but that's 
all right. We'll wait... 
 
Third, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ closes on what was one of the defining juxtapositions in the 
official narrative of the response to 9-11 and a theme commonplace throughout American 
media and society.  The fusing of American exceptionalism with individual acts of heroism Ð 
from fire fighters, the police and the passengers of United 93 in particular Ð was a recurrent 
theme in BushÕs speeches.52  American exceptionalism Ð the belief that America is unique 
and superior Ð was central to American foreign policy in the response to 9-11, as it had been 
during the 1990s, Cold War and Second World War before.53  What was unusual in American 
foreign policy after 9-11 was the degree to which these perceived national qualities were tied 
to the actions of individuals.  For instance, not only was America attacked because of its 
exceptional nature (Ôwe are the brightest beacon of freedom in the worldÕ), but the attacks 
were also seen to bring out the best in America and encourage Ôeveryday acts of 
exceptionalismÕ in ordinary Americans.  One frequently deployed strategy, was to contrast 
this exceptionalism Ð as manifest in the individual acts of heroism witnessed on 9-11 Ð with 
the cowardice of AmericaÕs enemies.  The question of whether suicide bombers were 
ÔcowardlyÕ had been a politically charged topic in the shadow of the fall of the Twin 
Towers.54  The West Wing correspondingly saved this topic for the showÕs close and the wise 
words of President Bartlett: 
 Boy 1: Well, don't you consider...I mean, I know they're our enemy, but don't you 
consider there's something noble about being a martyr?  
 Bartlett: A martyr would rather suffer death at the hands of an oppressor than 
renounce his beliefs. Killing yourself and innocent people to make a point 
is sick, twisted, brutal, dumb-ass murder. And let me leave you with this 
thought ... we don't need martyrs right now. We need heroes. A hero 
would die for his country but he'd much rather live for it... 
Juxtaposing American heroes and cowardly martyrs, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ closed once again 
by reinforcing and amplifying one of the key themes of the official response to 9-11.  Just as 
Bush frequently brought Ôgood AmericansÕ and Ôevil terroristsÕ together in official narratives 
for maximum impact through juxtaposition, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ did likewise.  Indeed, the 
tendency toward moral absolutes and American exceptionalism in The West Wing after 9-11 
was so great, and the tendency for Presidents Bush and Bartlett to converge in narratives so 
frequent, that some analysts have dubbed SorkinÕs fictionalised but increasingly hybrid White 
House Ôthe Bushlet AdministrationÕ.55 
 
                                                             
52 For example, George. W. Bush, ÔAddress to Joint Session of Congress and the American PeopleÕ, Capitol 
Building, Washington D.C. September 20, 2001.  See also Jackson, Writing. 
53 See, for example, Trevor McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2003). 
54 See, for example, James Der Derian, "The War of Networks". In Worlds in Collision, eds. Booth, K. (New 
York: Palgrave, 2002). 
55 Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger, ÔBushlet AdministrationÕ. 
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5. Television and (Im)possibility 
The possibility of the ÔWar on TerrorÕ was inevitably reliant upon Ôa background of 
social/discursive practices and meaningsÕ; such a background Ômakes possible the practices 
as well as the social actors themselvesÕ.56  Understanding how the ÔWar on TerrorÕ came Ôto 
appear necessaryÕ and Ôthe only reasonable course of actionÕ, whereas alternatives were 
rendered ÔunthinkableÕ, requires an appreciation of Ôthe way in which power works to 
constitute particular modes of subjectivity and interpretive dispositionsÕ.57  By helping to 
establish, what would become a largely agreed upon, background of discursive meanings, 
The West Wing through the ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ episode contributed to the possibility of the 
ÔWar on TerrorÕ and actively shut down the scope for debate in American politics and society 
after 9-11.   
 
Alternative voices were silenced by the amplification of official narratives.  Of course, The 
West Wing was far from alone in this enterprise.  Hayes and Guardino have noted that, in 
news coverage, ÔBush administration officials were the most frequently quoted sources, the 
voices of anti-war groups and opposition Democrats were barely audible, and the overall 
thrust of coverage favoured a pro-war perspectiveÕ.58  And, after 9-11, the new context of the 
ÔWar on TerrorÕ was frequently reflected and re-affirmed in television shows such as MI-
5/Spooks and 24.59  What makes ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ noteworthy then is that the episode is 
explicitly written to respond to the events of 9-11 from a liberal perspective and it does so 
before any other entertainment television show of a similar nature.  The show contributed to 
the rapid narrowing of the space from which alternative narratives could be put forward.  The 
openness of the void, which was so quickly closed down, had initially enabled some 
alternative, critical and dissenting voices to be heard: 
ÒItÕs not a surprise É No, itÕs not all that far-fetchedÓ. 
ÒI think Bin Laden is basically a geniusÓ. 
ÒÉ all he [President Bush] uses are buzz words like evil, good, resolve and youÕd 
think he was talking about a Star Wars movie or somethingÓ. 
ÒIt has nothing to do with freedom whatsoever É this might happen again so long as 
our policy towards the Middle East doesnÕt changeÓ. 
ÒThe American people arenÕt thinkingÓ. 
ÒI can sort of understand where Bin Laden is coming from É IÕm not necessarily 
proud to be an American É it will be a slightly longer version of the Oklahoma City 
bombingÓ. 
                                                             
56 Roxanne Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency 
Policy in the Philippines', International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (1993): 298. 
57 Ibid, 297-299. 
58 Danny Hayes and Matt Guardino, ÔWhose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the March to War in 
IraqÕ, Political Communication 27, no. 1 (2010): 59. 
59 Christian Erickson, ÔThematics of Counterterrorism: Comparing 24 and MI-5/SpooksÕ, Critical Studies on 
Terrorism 1, no. 3 (2008): 343-358. 
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ÒÉ well, donÕt people die every day?Ó60 
ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ contributed to the establishment of increasingly dominant discourses that 
marginalised these alternatives, acquiescing and co-opting potential oppositional voices.  This 
can be seen not only in the rapid disappearance of alternative voices amongst the general 
public but also in overwhelming bipartisan support for Government policies after 9-11.  The 
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists was opposed with only 
one vote against (Democrat Congresswoman Barbara Lee) compared to the five hundred and 
eighteen supporting votes the resolution received from across party lines in both houses of 
Congress.  In this context, The West Wing episode ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ can and should then be 
read as an important moment in the transition from void to crisis, as the meaning of 9-11 
slowly harmonised across American society and the Bush Administration established a 
hegemonic foreign policy discourse that would come to underpin the subsequent ÔWar on 
TerrorÕ.61 
  
In three principle and related ways, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ helped to make the ÔWar on TerrorÕ 
possible and to make alternative responses less likely.  First, SorkinÕs script clearly placed the 
government at the centre of key relationships in a post 9-11 world.  With government agency 
(and a monopoly on the use of violence) having been challenged so directly by the events of 
September 11th, re-locating and re-concentrating agency at the heart of government was an 
important move for the Bush Administration.  And it was aided by The West Wing.  By 
positioning government officials as the only people who can understand and fight terrorists, 
simultaneously explaining events to the public and keeping them safe, ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ 
places the Bush/Bartlett Administration as both the link and barrier between the public and 
terrorism.  The ambiguity of this dual role ensures agency is located at the heart of 
government and citizens are reliant on elected officials for the information that guides 
security policy and the safety those policies supposedly bring.  ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ 
encourages the role of government as judge, jury and executioner on the terrorist threat. 
 
Second, this (re-)elevation of the government to a position of Ôsovereign protectorÕ through 
both knowledge and ability is reinforced by a ÔrecognitionÕ that the response to terror is 
particularly challenging and will require great minds.  This is backed up by the fact that in 
ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ the showÕs stars are shown to be those minds teaching an informed but 
uncertain public.  Third, the episode thus confirms that the role of the public is to listen to 
those government officials who are ÔexpertsÕ, have the knowledge of and the capability to 
respond to terror that they themselves lack.  As has been shown, according to ÔIsaac and 
IshmaelÕ, the role of the public is to support officials by loving your family, your life and 
your country.  The decision to construct and perpetuate this distinction was not accidental.  
De Jonge reported from the set during filming that Sorkin instructed the characters to assert 
mastery of the facts.   
                                                             
60 It is a sad reflection on the dangers of talking in the ÔWar on TerrorÕ that have led me to anonymise these 
quotations, taken from interviews with ordinary American citizens conducted very shortly after 11 September 
2001.  All are available in the Witness and Response Collection at the Library of Congress and are respectively 
available on: SR375, September 13, 2001; SR375, September 13, 2001; SR381, September 15, 2001; SR381, 
September 15, 2001; SR085, September 20, 2001; SR276, September 20, 2001; SR376, September 19, 2001. 
61 For example, Croft, Culture; Jackson, Writing. 
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ÔYou don't have to be so somber and funereal. It's not a wake ... You're smart. You 
know these things. Here they areÕ.62 
This demonstration of knowledge is important in the transition from the post 9-11 void to a 
situation whereby understandings of terrorism are increasingly homogenised across society 
through the construction of 9-11 as crisis.   
 
Despite its scale, the shock it generated and its obvious significance for most Americans, 9-
11 was not self-evidently a crisis.63  To be constructed as a crisis, 9-11 relied upon a double 
articulation: the simultaneous identification of both the problem (the morbid underlying 
condition the events represented) and the solution.  As Colin Hay has argued, crises rely upon 
a population being shown the solution to the impasse.64  To be constructed as a crisis, 9-11 
required a decisive intervention to be made, which articulated the events Ôas ÔsymptomÕ-atic 
of a more general condition of crisisÕ and a ÔWar on TerrorÕ, conducted through the agency of 
the American military led by President Bush, as the solution.65  This Ôdecisive interventionÕ 
was essential to fill the void and respond to 9-11 as a crisis.66  And it was a task aided and 
abetted by ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ. 
 
Arguably, of course, all of this is nothing new.  The rapid-fire and intelligent nature of the 
dialogue is part of the showÕs attraction for its fan base, and as Michelle Mouton argues The 
West Wing generally validates the Ôcodes, desires and aspirations of the educated professional 
classÕ.67  Perhaps it should not be surprising that The West Wing helped to fill the post 9-11 
void by amplifying dominant narratives and assisting in the construction of 9-11 as crisis. 
However, there have been important instances of The West Wing confronting and challenging 
dominant narratives to imagine alternative possible futures.68  No better example of this exists 
than the prophetic seventh series, in which an overtly liberal, Hispanic candidate with soaring 
campaign rhetoric successfully overcomes the odds and expectations to win the presidential 
election.  The character, Matt Santos (played by Jimmy Smits), was modelled on a young, 
liberal and little-known Senator.  That Senator Ð Barack Obama Ð went on to win the real-
world presidency in 2008, creating a strong sense of dj vu for many who had watched The 
West Wing and cries that life was imitating art, imitating life.  As this brief example and the 
preceding discussion highlight, entertainment television can both confirm and challenge; it 
                                                             
62 Sorkin, cited in Peter De Jonge, ÔAaron Sorkin Works His Way Through the CrisisÕ, New York Times, 
October 28, 2001. 
63 Croft, Crisis; Holland, ÔFrom Void to CrisisÕ. 
64 Colin Hay, 'Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the `Winter of Discontent'', Sociology 30, no. 2 
(1996): 253-277. 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Croft, Crisis. 
67
 Michelle Mouton, ÔVictorian Parliamentary Novels, The West Wing and ProfessionalismÕ, in The West Wing: 
The American Presidency as Television Drama, eds. Rollins, P. and OÕConnor, J. (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2003), 187-202. 
68
 See, Ballard, ÔHavenÕt WeÕ; Brendan Carlin, George Jones and Toby Helm, ÔBlairÕs Whips Fooled by West 
Wing PlotÕ, The Telegraph, February 2, 2006, accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1509435/Blairs-whips-fooled-by-West-Wing-plot.html; Heather 
Hayton, ÔThe KingÕs Two Bodies: Identity and Office in SorkinÕs West WingÕ, in The West Wing: The 
American Presidency as Television Drama, eds. Rollins, P. and OÕConnor, J. (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 2003), 63-82; Hope, ÔWhyÕ; Freedland, ÔFrom West WingÕ, Woods, ÔLifeÕ. 
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has the potential to close down or open up space for debate in politics and society.  And that 
is why ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ remains so disappointing, disturbing and dangerous. 
 
Conclusion 
In reaction to the more vitriolic criticism that was launched at ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ, Aaron 
Sorkin agreed that the episode might not have been The West Wing at its best but also by 
denying that it mattered or that it was even an episode of The West Wing at all.   
ÔSome sort of respect had to be paid to the event that just happened ... We couldn't 
just do a regular 'West Wing.' I don't think that it was a good episode of 'The West 
Wing.' I don't think it was an episode of 'The West Wing.' I don't even know if it was 
good television. It was well intended, it was never meant to teach anything, to be 
preachyÕ.69 
Ô... the show had to bow its head somehow before it moved forwardÕ.70  
Executive Producer Thomas Schlamme confirms that the episode, inclusive of its limitations, 
was very much a product of that moment: 
ÔWe can remember the absolute visceral feeling that we all had those two weeks after 
Sept. 11 -- that episode was a product of those feelings. George W. Bush becoming 
president instead of Al Gore doesn't affect the show at all. But the pain of the nation 
and the pain that we all felt does affect the show a little bit. So it took awhile for us to 
find our sea legsÕ.71 
Similarly, this paper has argued that ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ was a product of the moment and 
also a powerful mechanism through which the moment was constructed in the terms set out 
by the Bush Administration.  It helped to settle some of the unease that characterised 
American society, filling the void in meaning that followed the events in Pennsylvania, 
Virginia and New York.  Having helped to establish 9-11 as crisis by reproducing emerging 
and increasingly dominant narratives, Sorkin has been adamant that NBC should not re-air 
the episode; it should remain something to be watched once and then locked away, never to 
be seen again.   
 
And yet, of course, the episode can be purchased to view, standing outside of the usual 
sequence and storylines, again and again.  The exceptionalism of 9-11 can be revisited, along 
with a purportedly Ôliberal responseÕ that reinforces dominant narratives, every time ÔIsaac 
and Ishmael is viewedÕ, out of continuity, by new and loyal viewers of The West Wing.  
Moreover, the narrowing performed by the foreign policy positions articulated and performed 
in ÔIsaac and IshmaelÕ does not stand alone.  Rather, as Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger have 
argued, the foreign policy of The West Wing was frequently Ômore hawkish than that of the 
Bush administrationÕ and these Ômessages matter; they matter in real and political waysÕ.72  
What Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger do not mention is that this was not always the case, but 
                                                             
69 Sorkin cited in Pat Nason, ÔWest Wing Boss Relieved 2001 is PastÕ, UPI, September 6, 2002. 
70 Sorkin cited in Bill Keveney, ÔPolitical powerhouse made TV historyÕ, USA Today, May 10, 2006. 
71 Cited in Daniel Coleridge, ÔWhy Bush Refused West Wing InviteÕ, TV Guide Online, April 14, 2002. 
72 Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger, ÔThe Bushlet AdministrationÕ, 100. 
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rather that, like many American politicians and citizens, The West Wing became more 
hawkish on foreign policy after the events of September 11th 2001.  Just as ÔIsaac and 
IshmaelÕ was a product and important contributor to the political context of the post 9-11 
moment, so other episodes are inevitably produced through the complex interactions of the 
showÕs directorÕs liberal leanings and the political circumstances of the time.  
 
It is only necessary to consider the measured, unemotional arguments on foreign policy put 
forward in the showÕs third ever episode titled ÔA Proportional ResponseÕ to appreciate this 
transition.  Here, President Bartlet is slowly led away from a desire to blow terrorists Ôoff the 
face of the earth with the fury of GodÕs own thunderÕ; he literally learns appropriate foreign 
policy behaviour based on Ôwhat our fatherÕs taught usÕ.  After 9-11, as the Bush 
Administration constructed a new era, replete with new and unprecedented dangers, which 
required new strategies, The West Wing followed suit.  Early calls for a Ôproportional 
responseÕ to terrorism stand in marked contrast to the plotlines that followed 9-11.  It is 
apparent that the events of September 11th had a dramatic impact on the show, the context in 
which the show aired, and on the broadly liberal views that informed plotlines.  Initial, 
generally liberal, concerns with responding appropriately in line with a respect for precedent 
and international law rapidly lost favour after 9-11, as instead the show turned to consider the 
need to step outside of international law with plots advocating the political assassination of 
leaders allied with terrorists.  Again, assisting the Bush Administration, The West Wing 
confirmed the exceptional nature of the post 9-11 world, in which a Ôwar paradigmÕ was 
required to keep us safe.  In this paradigm, it was accepted as necessary that the law may 
have to be suspended to ensure security. 
 
It is important that Political Scientists and International Relations take fictional dramas 
seriously.73  They exert considerable influence in shaping public opinion and can help to 
derail or to reinforce the official policies of elected officials.  They are also an important 
gauge, driver and reflector of Ôreal worldÕ political currents of thought.  As ÔsofterÕ liberal 
arguments lost out in post 9-11 America to the Ôhard WilsonianÕ positions advocated by neo-
conservatives Ð famously described by Irving Kristol as liberals mugged by reality Ð The 
West Wing helped to imitate and initiate this crucial transition.  As the official narratives and 
policy of the Bush Administration were put forward, The West Wing gave credence to the 
particular and contingent vision they offered, helping to contextualise the terror threat and 
naturalise the response they entailed for the American public.  This was done by using 
established characters and a carefully crafted script to ensure that both BushÕs and BartletÕs 
ÔWar on TerrorÕ would resonate at home.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
73 See, for good examples, Cynthia Weber, Imagining America at War: Morality, Politics and Film, (London: 
Routledge, 2006); and Jutta Weldes, ÔPopular Culture, Science Fiction and World PoliticsÕ in To Seek Out New 
Worlds: Exploring Links Between Science Fiction and World Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2003). 
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